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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
A New Risk to the  
EU from Coronavirus
Viktor Orbán’s Hungary
Political leaders could abuse the coro-
navirus crisis to undermine democra-
cy. Europe’s biggest risk is Hungary. 
In late March, Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán could use his two-thirds ma-
jority in parliament to push through 
a law that would empower him to rule 
by decrees with no specified time lim-
it. If he succeeds, it will undermine 
the European Union’s core principles, 
making the EU even more fragmented 
and difficult to manage once the pan-
demic is over.
As of March 24, 2020, Hungary had 226 
confirmed COVID-19 infections and 
ten fatalities according to data from 
the World Health Organization. In mid-
March, using the developing crisis as a 
justification, the Hungarian govern-
ment submitted a draft law that would 
theoretically make it possible for Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán to rule by de-
crees for an unlimited period of time 
without any meaningful parliamentary 
control. Budapest’s policies might be a 
signal to other national governments 
that political exploitation of the coro-
navirus crisis to introduce restrictions 
to fundamental political freedoms is 
possible. Consequently, this develop-
ment is of huge importance for the Eu-
ropean Union, where there is currently 
no political resolve to deal with such 
a sensitive issue at the EU level. If the 
European Union as a whole attempt-
ed to address the pandemic, howev-
er, such an approach could undermine 
its founding principles, common val-
ues, and coherence, deepening exist-
ing fault lines and internal divisions. 
THE PRELUDE:  
A STATE OF DANGER 
On March 11, 2020, as an initial re-
sponse to the developing COVID-19 
pandemic, Hungary declared a “State of 
Danger,” a special form of legal regime. 
According to the Hungarian constitu-
tion, the government can introduce 
a State of Danger until it declares the 
end of a given threat. While the State of 
Danger is in force, the government can 
rule by decrees, suspend laws specified 
in the country’s law on disaster man-
agement, and revoke or limit many in-
dividual and collective rights – although 
it cannot act against the constitution it-
self. While the State of Danger is in ef-
fect, no elections may be held.
Any decrees adopted by the govern-
ment during a State of Danger are only 
valid for 15 days. Thereafter, if the gov-
ernment intends to keep those decrees 
in force, parliament has to extend their 
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validity for another 15 days by a two-
thirds majority, and thereafter again 
and again. At present, Viktor Orbán’s 
coalition has a two-thirds majority so 
that, as long as parliament is opera-
tional, it should easily be able to extend 
the validity of the decrees it proposes. 
Still, the 15-day limit constitutes an im-
portant check on executive power.
Another check is that Hungary’s con-
stitutional court has the right to oversee 
decisions made by the government 
during a State of Danger. In the coun-
try’s contemporary political context, 
however, the constitutional court 
hardly offers a counterbalance to the 
government. Since Orbán took pow-
er in 2010, he has used the two-thirds 
majority he has had in parliament for 
most of his tenure to weaken the pow-
er of the court and fill it with govern-
ment loyalists, some of whom are not 
even constitutional lawyers.
THE EMPOWERMENT LAW
On March 20, 2020 – referring to the 
need to efficiently combat COVID-19 – 
Orbán’s government submitted a draft 
law to parliament that would abol-
ish the 15-day limitation on the validity 
of decrees adopted during a State of 
Danger. Because Hungary’s law on 
disaster management was mostly 
written to address floods and industrial 
disasters rather than a pandemic, its le-
gal system is indeed struggling to cre-
ate the necessary measures to fully 
cover issues related to the current crisis. 
However, this new law, which is widely 
referred to as the “Empowerment Law,” 
gives a too heavy-handed answer to le-
gal problems that unquestionably exist.
If adopted, the Empowerment Law 
would give Prime Minster Orbán large-
ly unchecked power without any defi-
nite time limit by doing three main 
things. First, it would make decrees en-
acted during a State of Danger valid 
until either the government or the par-
liament rules that they are no longer 
necessary. Currently, both are firmly 
controlled by Orbán’s Fidesz Par-
ty. Moreover, even if neither body can 
come to a formal decision, decrees 
made in this State of Danger will stay in 
force after the COVID-19 crisis is over. 
Second, the Empowerment Law would 
make it possible for the government to 
suspend any laws – not only the ones 
specified in the law on disaster man-
agement – except for the constitution. 
Hence, by using the current pandem-
ic as a pretext, the government could 
regulate all fields of life in the coun-
try by decrees and without any par-
liamentary control. And third, the law 
would modify Hungary’s criminal code, 
decisively widening the definition of 
fearmongering and spreading false 
information, as well as increasing their 
punishment to one to five years impris-
onment. Both opposition and civil so-
ciety forces are concerned that this 
modification would make it possible 
for the government to massively crack 
down on media critical of its agenda.
The government had initially want-
ed to get this Empowerment Law ad-
opted with extra urgency on March 24. 
Because an extra urgency procedure 
requires more votes to support it, the 
opposition could then have blocked it. 
The ruling coalition is now planning to 
have parliament vote on the Empow-
erment Law in a normal procedure at 
the end of March, when its two-thirds 
majority is likely to result in it being 
enacted.
Opposition worries have been fueled 
by the example set by a law on the 
“state of crisis caused by mass migra-
tion,” which was introduced and codi-
fied as a response to developments in 
2015. Although in the four years after 
the crisis peaked barely any migrants 
have tried to come to Hungary, this 
“state of crisis” continues to be kept 
in force today. Not surprisingly, the 
opposition is concerned about the 
ramifications of Orbán’s proposed Em-
powerment Law.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
THE EU AND GERMANY
Though certain illiberal tendencies and 
rule-of-law issues can be seen in other 
countries of Central Europe, Hungary’s 
response to the pandemic is unique. 
So far, none of its three partners in the 
Visegrád Group has decided to widen 
the constitutional framework it currently 
has to manage emergency situations – 
despite the fact that, at this writing, the 
number of reported cases of COVID-19 
in Poland and the Czech Republic are 
considerably higher than in Hungary. 
If other countries would follow Hun-
gary’s example, however, the Europe-
an Union could quickly get to a point 
where a fight against COVID-19 at the 
EU level could result in the introduction 
of serious, lasting constraints of fun-
damental political freedom and human 
rights, thus endangering the very prin-
ciples upon which the EU was founded.
The Commission should review all 
restrictions on civil liberties made in 
the EU in response to the crisis
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Consequently, the European Union 
should clearly state, ideally at the 
highest level of the European Council, 
that any and all restrictions of civil 
liberties that are inevitable to combat-
ing the pandemic are only justified un-
til they can be phased out as soon as 
the situation allows. This especially 
applies to any modifications of demo-
cratic decision-making within member 
states and to all restrictions on free-
dom of movement – from local or na-
tional curfews to measures affecting 
the entire Schengen Area.
With respect to Hungary, the rule by 
decree – practically unlimited in terms 
of time – that could result from Orbán’s 
Empowerment Law cannot in any way 
be justified by the COVID-19 crisis. It 
would be a clear violation of Article 7 
of the Treaty on the European Union, 
which aims to ensure that all EU coun-
tries respect common values, including 
the rule of law. Hence, current de-
velopments in Hungary constitute a 
strong argument for linking rule-of-
law issues to EU budgetary support.
Given the Hungarian prime minister’s 
recent moves, it is important for both 
the EU and Germany to prepare for an 
attempt by Orbán at keeping extraor-
dinary powers even after the end of 
the pandemic. Though this concern 
might seem to be a distant one at pres-
ent, the possibility indeed exists. Al-
though an initial approach to Budapest 
should be constructive and not assume 
the worst, cooperation should be ac-
companied by thorough monitoring 
in order to ensure that any extra pow-
ers are not misused and restrictions to 
civil liberties are warranted. Monitor-
ing should be conducted by both the 
European Commission and the Coun-
cil in the framework of the ongoing Ar-
ticle 7 proceedings that were initiated 
by the European Parliament in Sep-
tember 2018.
In addition to examining the worry-
ing developments in Hungary, the Eu-
ropean Commission should also re-
view all restrictions on civil liberties 
made throughout the European Union 
in response to the COVID-19 crisis. It 
should include these observations in 
the reports on all EU member states 
that are due in the second semester of 
2020 under Germany’s EU presidency.
